After two years of war, Israel and Hamas have agreed on the “first phase” of a US-backed peace plan for Gaza. The deal, if it holds, will involve the release of Israeli hostages and Palestinian prisoners, the withdrawal of Israeli troops from Gaza and the entry of aid into the enclave.
The president of the Palestinian Authority, Mahmoud Abbas, has welcomed the news. He has expressed hope that the deal acts as a “prelude to reaching a permanent political solution” between Israel and Palestine.
But what lies ahead for Hamas? A clause in the wider peace plan calls for the full dissolution of the group, both as a militant organisation and as a civil administration. It is difficult to see how Hamas leadership will negotiate their way through this without some form of disarmament or demobilisation.
The Israeli government, with backing from the US and other western countries such as the UK, has repeatedly said the full demobilisation of Hamas and its militant wing is the only possible outcome it will accept. This leads to a significant dilemma for Hamas.
Its entire reason for existence is to seek the destruction of the Israeli state through violence. There is no room for peaceful, democratic means in its objectives. So if the Hamas leadership are to pursue some form of demobilisation, they risk fracturing the organisation into dissenting armed factions that continue their militancy against Israel.
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The Wall Street Journal reports that Hamas’s lead negotiator, Khalil al-Hayya, as well as other political officials living outside of Gaza, are ready to accept disarmament as part of a wider peace process. But analysts suggest other leaders and militants still based in Gaza may be less willing to compromise.
Hamas has remained remarkably resilient throughout the two years of war in Gaza. US figures from early 2025 showed that Hamas had added up to 15,000 new volunteers since the October 7 attacks in 2023, largely replacing those it had lost since the start of the conflict. Many of these recruits may be reluctant to surrender their weapons after losing family and property during the war.
At the same time, Hamas is not the only armed Palestinian group operating in Gaza. Although Hamas led the October 7 attacks against Israel, the attacking force contained militants from multiple armed groups.
These included Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ), the Marxist-Leninist Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine, the Al-Aqsa Martyrs Brigades, the Maoist Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine (DFLP) and the Palestinian Mujahideen Movement.
Some of these groups, including the PIJ, are thought to have joined Hamas in peace talks with Israel. Others are less willing to enter negotiations. The DFLP, for example, has said in a statement that it rejects any form of international mandate or guardianship in Gaza. This includes the future involvement of the former British prime minister, Sir Tony Blair, or an international security force.
Beyond Gaza, Hamas has to consider its future in broader Palestinian politics. The armed group has ruled over Gaza since 2007. But its traditional opponent, Fatah, which Hamas expelled from the Gaza Strip in 2007 following a bloody feud, continues to wield significant political authority in the West Bank through its dominance of the Palestinian Authority.
Relations between Hamas and Fatah have been cordial in recent years. But Hamas may fear any demobilisation of its armed forces could shift the balance of power within Palestinian politics, enabling the Palestinian Authority to renew efforts for Gaza to rejoin the West Bank under a single, unified political authority.
Some form of disarmament is possible
Comparable case studies show that the disarmament and demobilisation of insurgent groups is possible, at least in part. In Northern Ireland, the Provisional Irish Republican Army (Pira) decommissioned a large portion of its weaponry in 2005 following protracted peace negotiations.
The Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (Farc) also demobilised its armed units in 2017, a year after a historic peace settlement was reached between the Colombian state and the leftist rebels. Both organisations disarmed despite the presence of other armed groups, such as dissident republicans in Northern Ireland and the National Liberation Army in Colombia, that continued to wage violent campaigns.
Yet in Northern Ireland, the Pira never fully demobilised its volunteer base nor did it decommission all of its weapons. British security services and the Northern Irish police have found evidence that Pira members have been involved in several murders against internal opponents since the group decommissioned.
British intelligence also believes that the Pira’s militant structures and decision-making body, the army council, remain intact. They allege that these people now oversee the political strategy of Sinn Féin, an Irish republican political party.
While some insurgent groups disarm and demobilise, their legacy is slow to fade. Would Israel be willing to accept a similar disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration arrangement in Gaza as the British have done in Northern Ireland?
It is difficult to see the government of Israeli prime minister, Benjamin Netanyahu, which has continually reiterated that Hamas must be completely destroyed, doing so. Yet a different Israeli administration might.
It also remains to be seen whether Hamas could plausibly disarm a portion of its forces, such as its rocket units and armed assault groups, and allow others to be absorbed into a security force system governed by a body styled on the Palestinian Authority.
A monumental shift in strategic direction would be required for Hamas to reach this point. And the group is arguably more ideologically entrenched now as an Islamist Palestinian movement than the Pira was in the 1990s or the Farc in the 2010s.
Hamas is at a crossroads. It now faces either a period of negotiating for its future with little room to manoeuvre or further war with Israel if it refuses to dissolve. The challenge for mediators is to find a pathway that satisfies Israeli security demands and Hamas’s own quest for survival and transformation within Palestinian politics.
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